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Temple Grandin is well known as a representative of both people with 4 
autism and of the meat industry. She rose to prominence through the work of 5 
Oliver Sacks, whose 1995 book, An Anthropologist on Mars, was named after a 6 
phrase Grandin used to describe her life as a person with autism in a non-7 
autistic world, one that contains social and emotional cues she finds difficult 8 
to decipher. Grandin has since gone on to become a bestselling author in her 9 
own right, and writings by and about her highlight her career as a designer of 10 
humane slaughterhouses. In both her popular books as well as over 100 peer-11 
reviewed articles she has published as an animal scientist, Grandin frequently 12 
addresses issues related to the ethical status of animals, and makes arguments 13 
to the effect that when animals are killed in her system the result is ethically 14 
superior not only to traditional slaughter but also to vegan agriculture.  15 
Systems designed by Grandin have long handled over half the cattle killed 16 
for food in Canada and the United States (Grandin 2001: 103). Facilities she 17 
designed are also located in Europe, Asia, Australia and South America. 18 
Chances are good that readers of this work who eat meat will have consumed 19 
beef, pork or chicken processed according to Grandin’s method at least once. 20 
As for Grandin’s ethical ideas as they pertain to animals, they have been 21 
disseminated by CNN, NBC and the BBC, not to mention every major 22 
newspaper in the English-speaking world.1 In terms of her industrial impact 23 
                                                
1 For a small sampling of Grandin’s electronic media coverage see Grandin 2009c. Typing 
Grandin’s name into the Factiva newspaper database calls up over 1,600 articles from across 
the English-speaking world.  
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and audience, Grandin is one of the world’s most influential voices on animal 24 
issues.  25 
In spite of Grandin’s prominence, animal ethicists have taken little interest 26 
in her work.2 Although the ethics of killing and eating animals that are killed 27 
painlessly has been extensively analysed, the discussion to date has been at an 28 
abstract level, with little attention to the question of whether or to what 29 
degree existing systems such as Grandin’s have eliminated pain from the 30 
slaughter process (e.g. Singer 1993; Višak 2013). Similarly, Grandin’s writings 31 
frequently defend omnivorism as superior to vegetarianism or veganism. 32 
Given the size of her audience, these arguments are among the most widely 33 
read arguments, pro or con, on the ethics of eating meat. As such the need to 34 
analyze them also is overdue.  35 
What follows is an attempt to bring animal protection theory to bear on 36 
Grandin’s work, in her capacity both as a designer of slaughter facilities and 37 
as an advocate for omnivorism. Animal protection is a better term for what is 38 
often termed animal rights, given that many of the theories grouped under 39 
the animal rights label do not extend the concept of rights to animals (e.g. 40 
Singer 1990, McMahan 2002). Animal protection thus is an umbrella term for 41 
theories such as those of Singer, Regan (2004), McMahan and Cochrane 42 
(2012). Despite their differences, such theories eschew speciesism and grant 43 
equal moral weight to the interest animals have in avoiding suffering relative 44 
to the similar interest of human beings. With the exception of Singer, who 45 
argues that it is permissible to kill merely sentient animals so long as they are 46 
                                                
2 Gary Francione and Jeff McMahan are among the few animal theorists to comment on 
Grandin. See the brief discussions in Francione 1996: 99-100, 199-202, and 2008: 74-5 and 
McMahan 2002: 200-03. Peter Singer discusses lobbying efforts to persuade McDonald’s to 
hire Grandin in Singer 1998: 166-77. I have not been able to find any scholarly discussion of 
Grandin’s defence of meat-eating. 
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replaced, all such theorists call into question the practice of systematically 47 
killing animals when nutritious plant-based alternative are widely available. 48 
My analysis endorses these two widely held views in the animal protection 49 
literature regarding animal suffering. As such it seeks to be ecumenical across 50 
such approaches by appealing to ideas they all agree on, with the exception of 51 
Singer’s outlier view on the replaceability of merely sentient beings (Singer 52 
2011: 94-122).3  53 
 I outline the nature of Grandin’s system of humane slaughter as it 54 
pertains to cattle. I focus on her cattle system because it is the one she has 55 
devoted the most time and energy to developing and is the system with 56 
which she has long been most identified.4 I then outline four arguments 57 
Grandin has made defending meat-eating. Two of these arguments appeal to 58 
evolutionary considerations while a third posits the fact that we cannot but 59 
help grant moral significance to membership in the species Homo sapiens, 60 
which inevitably entails a lower moral status for livestock and other animals. 61 
Grandin’s fourth and final argument maintains that when the slaughter 62 
process is performed correctly it yields moral insights of a kind not attainable 63 
through the cultivation of plant food. On a protection-based approach, I 64 
argue, Grandin’s system of slaughter is superior to its traditional counterpart. 65 
Grandin’s success as a designer of humane slaughterhouses however is not 66 
matched by any corresponding success in offering a moral defence of meat-67 
eating. Despite, or perhaps because of, the popularity of her work, Grandin’s 68 
arguments for continuing to eat animals are noteworthy only in how 69 
disappointing and rudimentary they are. If we can thank Grandin for making 70 
                                                
3 For critical discussion of Singer’s view on killing animals see Višak (2013: 46-70). 
4 For an analysis of Grandin’s system of slaughter for chicken see Chapter Five of Lamey 
(2019). 
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a difference in the lives of millions of farm animals, her work can also be 71 
criticized for not engaging the moral status of animals with the depth and 72 
rigor that the issue deserves.  73 
Grandin’s Method of Slaughter  74 
Grandin has written that much of her success in working with animals 75 
comes from the fact that “I see all kinds of connections between their behavior 76 
and certain autistic behaviors” (2006a: 172).5 She gives the example of 77 
responses to high-pitched noise. Just as someone whistling in the middle of 78 
the night will cause her heart to race more than it would that of a non-autistic 79 
person, animals are easily startled by noises such as a bell or the sudden hiss 80 
of an air brake (2006a: 169). Grandin’s system therefore not only minimizes 81 
high-pitch sounds that animals can hear, it also eliminates many visual details 82 
that loom large from an animal’s point of view. In the case of cows for 83 
example, an entire herd can stop if it comes across a swinging chain, which 84 
will cause the lead cow to move its head back and forth with its swing. 85 
Similarly, strong visual contrasts such as shadows, light reflecting in a puddle 86 
or a drain running across the animals’ path will cause balking. Even 87 
something as seemingly minor as a styrofoam cup on the ground or a piece of 88 
cloth flapping in the wind can cause a herd to freeze up (2006a: 167-8). 89 
Grandin’s system meticulously avoids all such distractions that can cause the 90 
animals to stop moving.  91 
                                                
5 Karen Davis has challenged Grandin’s claim that her system of slaughter is inspired by her 
autism. “Many of the problems Grandin presents herself as uniquely spotting in the 
slaughterhouse environment are the kinds of things that an intelligent non-autistic sees on 
entering an inbred culture” (Davis 2005: 1). Grandin’s emphasis on a link between autism and 
animal behaviour is noticeably more pronounced in her popular books than in her academic 
writings and may sometimes be slightly exaggerated. However, I am more inclined to accept 
it than Davis is. Among other reasons, there have been cases of other autistic people 
identifying strongly with animal behaviours (e.g. Price-Hughes 2004).  
 5 
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Image One: A Curved Handling Chute  93 
 94 
At a structural level, one of the most distinctive features of a plant 95 
designed by Grandin is its curved handling chute, which is located between 96 
the holding pens and the slaughter facility proper. The chute’s design 97 
principles are rooted in animal behaviour research (Grandin 2003). This is 98 
evident in the fact that the chute has solid walls. The location of a cow’s eyes 99 
on the sides of its head gives it almost 360˚ panoramic vision, but only when 100 
looking ahead does it have binocular eyesight. The lack of depth perception to 101 
the side or rear means that even distant objects in those directions can appear 102 
to be within the animal’s flight zone. Solid walls in the chute eliminate the 103 
possibility of the animal seeing people or other distractions outside of the 104 
facility that might startle them (Grandin 1983a: 2).  105 
The curvature in the chute follows a similar logic. It is more efficient than 106 
a straight chute as the cows cannot see people or moving objects up ahead, 107 
which can cause them to balk. Cattle will also not enter a chute that bends too 108 
sharply, which to them appears to be a dead end. In Grandin’s system the 109 
degree of curvature allows entering cows to see at least two body lengths 110 
ahead. In nature cows will move in a circle to keep an eye on possible 111 
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predators and both the curve in the chute and the single-file width exploit this 112 
natural tendency (Grandin 2002b). The end result is that rather than plant 113 
personnel having to force a herd through the chute, most cows will willingly 114 
walk through on their own.  115 
People with autism often experience anxiety and panic attacks, 116 
particularly in unfamiliar situations. Grandin was able to diminish her 117 
anxiety by building a so-called Squeeze Box, a device which she lies in to have 118 
even pressure applied to both sides of her body, an experience which many 119 
autistic people find soothing. Grandin’s Squeeze Box, which is now sold 120 
commercially, was inspired by an animal husbandry device known as a 121 
squeeze chute, which is used during vaccination and other procedures in 122 
which an animal needs to be immobilized. Grandin’s slaughter system in turn 123 
employs a device partly inspired by her Squeeze Box, which is known as a 124 
conveyor restrainer. It is what is waiting for the animals at the end of the 125 
handling chute after they enter the slaughterhouse, where they are 126 
immediately immobilized in a low-stress manner.  127 
 128 
Image Two: The Conveyor Restrainer 129 
 130 
As image two illustrates, a leg-spreader bar and false floor position the 131 
animals so that as they step forward their weight shifts onto a conveyor belt. 132 
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The walls of the conveyor restrainer are again solid, but unlike the handling 133 
chute they apply pressure to the animal’s body, firmly enough to keep the 134 
animal in place, but not so hard as to cause gouging. The absence of noise and 135 
the experience of motion in an upright position have a calming effect on the 136 
animal, as does the presence of other animals, particularly when they are 137 
close enough to touch each other and are all from the same herd. A rack 138 
above the animal’s head prevents lunging by eliminating the sight of people 139 
and other threatening figures deep inside its flight zone. In a beef plant the 140 
conveyor belt is additionally shaped so as to fit a bull’s brisket. As the animal 141 
moves forward it is brought to the stunning platform where a plant employee 142 
is waiting with a captive bolt stunner. The stunner operator positions the gun-143 
like tool on the animal’s forehead to fire a bolt into its brain, a procedure 144 
which when properly performed instantly knocks the animal unconscious, 145 
thereby resulting in a painless method of death (Grandin: 1995: 1, 2009a: 1).6 146 
Elements such as the handling chute and the conveyor restrainer illustrate 147 
the technical details of Grandin’s system. Yet Grandin has often stressed that 148 
the most important element of her system is not any mechanical aspect, but 149 
the way it is used. As she puts it, “the best equipment in the world is 150 
worthless unless management controls the behavior of plant employees” 151 
(2006a: 175). A key aspect of her system therefore involves plant audits. 152 
Unannounced inspectors record the success rate of various procedures 153 
throughout the animals’ time inside a facility. In a beef plant for example 154 
auditors observe the slaughter of set number of cows, such as 50, 100 or 1,000, 155 
                                                
6 Grandin has separate guidelines for electric stunning, a potentially painless method used on 
pigs and sheep, and ritual slaughter methods (kosher and halaal) that prohibit stunning and 
require placing the animals in a head-immobilizing device before its throat is slit. See 
respectively Grandin (2008) and Grandin and Regenstein (1994). 
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and record what percentage of them are instantly rendered insensible with 156 
one shot of the bolt gun, marking employee performance according to the 157 
following criteria: 158 
 159 
Excellent = 99 to 100 per cent of animals killed with one shot  160 
Acceptable = 95 to 98 per cent of animals killed with one shot  161 
Not acceptable = 90 to 94 per cent of animals killed with one shot  162 
Serious problem = under 90 per cent of animals killed with one shot 163 
 164 
Other audited criteria include the number of animals that slip, fall or 165 
vocalize while inside the facility, how many are still conscious when they 166 
reach the bleed rail and the rate at which employees use cattle prods, with use 167 
on up to 25 per cent of processed animals rated acceptable. If an employee 168 
commits a wilful act of abuse, such as hitting an animal or applying a prod to 169 
its rectum or other sensitive area, it is grounds for automatic audit failure. 170 
Publicly available summaries of audits conducted between 2007 and 2015 171 
indicate a total of 187 audits performed at unidentified beef facilities (Grandin 172 
2018). Of these 172 audits (92 per cent) resulted in a pass, often with very high 173 
scores: 137 audits (74 per cent) recorded 99 to 100 per cent of cattle being 174 
successfully stunned with one shot of the captive bolt gun. Fourteen audits 175 
resulted in failure and two required a re-audit following a corrective action 176 
letter. Grounds for failure ranged from cutting off the leg of a conscious cow 177 
to touching a cow with a cattle prod on a sensitive part of its body. Plants 178 
were re-audited when more than two per cent of cows fell during live 179 
handling or more than five per cent vocalized during handling and stunning. 180 
Such scores are broadly representative of how most plants have performed 181 
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since Grandin’s program was adopted at the turn of the century (Singer: 1998: 182 
166-77). Plants that incorporate Grandin’s technology and auditing method 183 
generally score highly.  184 
Grandin has frequently framed the appeal of her system in economic 185 
terms. Animals that go through her system have been measured to have the 186 
same level of the stress hormone cortisol as they do when undergoing 187 
vaccination (Grandin 1998). They also receive fewer bruises than at traditional 188 
slaughter plants (Grandin 2000). These and other factors increase the value of 189 
the animal’s carcass, factors which Grandin frequently cites to suggest that a 190 
humane system is a more profitable one (Grandin 1983b, 2000, 2009b). 191 
Grandin’s Arguments for Omnivorism 192 
Grandin’s writings offer an ethical rationale for her system of slaughter. 193 
That rationale is one that recognizes animals’ interest in avoiding suffering, 194 
but stops short of advocating a plant-based diet. “Often I get asked if am a 195 
vegetarian,” she has written. “I eat meat, because I believed that a totally 196 
vegan diet, in which all animal products are eliminated, is unnatural” (2006a: 197 
235). Grandin’s writings present a series of arguments to the effect that her 198 
system is superior not only to traditional slaughter, but that eating meat is 199 
superior to veganism, on grounds that appeal not only to “naturalness” but 200 
more purely normative concerns. Fully assessing Grandin’s animal ethic 201 
therefore requires examining the justifications for the superiority of meat-202 
eating that she has put forward.  203 
Grandin’s most sophisticated argument does not originate with her. 204 
Rather she credits an argument made by Stephen Budiansky that “had a 205 
profound effect on [her] thinking” regarding animals (2006a: 235). Budiansky 206 
offers a coevolutionary defence of meat-eating. Coevolution occurs when one 207 
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species triggers evolutionary change in another. In Budiansky’s view, this 208 
principle explains the rise of modern agriculture, which is not merely the 209 
creation of human beings but, in a real sense, is the creation of domesticated 210 
animal as well. Such a view is inspired by the work of anthropologist David 211 
Rindos, who has put forward a co-evolutionary explanation for plant 212 
domestication (Rindos 1984). Budiansky innovates on Rindos not only by 213 
extending his theory to animal domestication, but by invoking it as an 214 
argument against veganism. According to Budinasky, were we to attempt to 215 
abolish meat farming, we would be turning our back on the metaphoric 216 
equivalent of a moral contract between human beings and domesticated 217 
animals, one that benefits not only us but also the animals (Budiansky 1999).  218 
Coevolution is known to occur in nature with symbiotic species. 219 
Budiansky gives the example of an African species of melon that only grows 220 
outside the tunnels of aardvarks (1999: 84). The aardvarks eat the melons and, 221 
through their toilet habits, plant the melons’ seeds in fertile mounds. Unlike 222 
all other wild cucurbits (the species to which melons belong) the variety eaten 223 
by aardvarks do not contain a bitter toxin. This increases the reproductive 224 
fitness of the melons, as they are able to reproduce by having their seeds 225 
distributed by the aardvarks. The aardvarks have access to a safe and 226 
abundant water supply, and so benefit from sharing a habitat with melons. 227 
Thus although the aardvarks have a greater influence on the evolutionary 228 
history of the melons than vice versa, both species benefit from the 229 
relationship (1999: 84). 230 
On Budiansky’s account something similar has happened between human 231 
beings and food animals. He asks us to imagine the original contact between 232 
human beings and members of the species that eventually became 233 
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domesticated. Such contact occurred over 9,000 years ago, shortly after the 234 
end of an ice age. During periods of climactic upheaval, many species of 235 
mammals and birds would have undergone a process known as neoteny, 236 
whereby traits associated with juvenile members of a species are retained into 237 
adulthood. “All young mammals and birds,” Budiansky writes, “show a 238 
curiosity about their surroundings, an ability to learn new things, a lack of 239 
fear of new situations, and even a nondiscriminating willingness to associate 240 
and play with members of other species,” (1999: 77-8). Adults that retained 241 
such juvenile characteristics would have increased their reproductive fitness 242 
during an ice age, as they would have been more likely to seek out and 243 
inhabit new territories after their original habitats were iced over. Given that 244 
such animals would have come in contact with human beings soon after, they 245 
would have increased their reproductive fitness in a second way, in that their 246 
more curious and gentler nature would have allowed them to occupy what 247 
was in effect a new habitat, the human sphere of domestication.  248 
Budiansky invokes the concept of preadaptation to summarize the initial 249 
contact between humans and domesticated species (1989: 5). Preadaptation is 250 
misunderstood if it is taken to imply an intentional or teleological process of 251 
change. It rather refers to a process whereby an adaptation or other trait that 252 
evolved to perform one function is used for a new, potentially unrelated 253 
function. In this case, curiosity and other traits helpful in seeking out new 254 
natural habitats preadapted sheep, cows, horses pigs and chickens to be 255 
suitable for domestication. The process of change in the animals would only 256 
have continued after domestication began, as domesticated animals 257 
increasingly took on docility and other characteristics that separated them 258 
from their wild counterparts. The result thousands of years later is that food 259 
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animals are now adapted to occupy the ecological niche that is human 260 
agriculture.  261 
For Budiansky, the evolutionary history of domesticated animals creates 262 
an onus on us to continue raising them for food. This is because 263 
domestication is not a purely cultural process. Cultural matters we regard as 264 
subject to our control. Budianksy gives the example of someone saying that 265 
we should not abolish nuclear weapons on the grounds that they are the 266 
natural product of evolution. Such a person would fail to adequately 267 
distinguish culture from nature (1999: 163). With regard to food animals 268 
however, their genetic character and behavior “is arguably much more the 269 
product of evolution in its truest sense, something that is not subordinate to 270 
human consciousness. The fate of these species was dictated by nature more 271 
than by man’s cultural institutions” (1999: 164). Were veganism to become 272 
popular, it would represent an abandonment of our ethical responsibilities to 273 
the animals whose destiny we now find intertwined with our own. Or as 274 
Budiansky puts it in the article that first caught Grandin’s eye, “we now have 275 
no choice but to care for animals that as a result of thousands of years of 276 
evolution are genetically programed to depend on us” (1989: 5).  277 
Grandin takes over from Budiansky the notion that food animals benefit 278 
from our consumption of them. One benefit they gain is an ability to 279 
reproduce in large numbers. With almost a billion cattle in the world, there is 280 
no danger of them going extinct any time soon (Statista 2018). But another 281 
thing animals gain from agriculture is a more merciful death than they would 282 
experience in the wild. Starvation, exposure, being torn apart by another 283 
animal: against this backdrop, being knocked unconscious and killed with a 284 
bolt through the brain would seem the far better option (Grandin 2006a: 235).  285 
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Grandin’s second argument makes a separate appeal to evolution. 286 
Grandin has noted that she once tried vegetarianism and found that it made 287 
her physically ill. She suggests that people with autism and similar conditions 288 
may be physically unable to live on a meat-free diet. People with conditions 289 
such as autism are of course only a small portion of the population, and 290 
Grandin does not invoke her experience as a justification for universal meat-291 
eating. Instead she speculates on a possible genetic link between being autistic 292 
and having a metabolism that requires eating meat, a speculation which in 293 
turn leads her to offer an evolutionary justification of meat eating that does 294 
apply to the general population:  295 
 296 
[U]ntil someone proves otherwise I’m operating from the 297 
hypothesis that at lest some people [such as people with 298 
autism] are genetically built so that they have to have meat 299 
to function. Even if that’s not so, the fact that humans 300 
evolved as both plant and meat eaters means that the vast 301 
majority of human beings are going to continue to eat both. 302 
Humans are animals, too, and we do what our animal 303 
natures tell us to do. (Grandin and Johnson 2005: 180).  304 
 305 
This is Grandin’s second evolutionary argument against plant-based diets. 306 
Whether or not people with autism have a special need for meat, she 307 
suggests, it is a fact about our species that we evolved as omnivores. 308 
Veganism is thus not as natural as meat-eating. Ethicists who advocate meat-309 
free diets may do so due to an interest in animals, but in an important sense, 310 
they overlook our own needs as animals. 311 
A third argument Grandin has offered to justify omnivorism over 312 
veganism involves a different appeal to biology. It occurs when Grandin 313 
grapples with the question of why a human being and an animal with similar 314 
cognitive abilities should occupy different moral statuses. Grandin uses the 315 
example of a cow and a mentally handicapped child with the same level of 316 
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cognitive development. It is perfectly acceptable to sell or kill the cow, she 317 
notes, but forbidden to do the same to a handicapped child. Grandin asks 318 
why the handicapped child or human newborn should have more protection 319 
than the bovine (2002a: 2). This of course is a question that frequently occurs 320 
in the debate over the ethical status of animals, in which the standard 321 
approach is to think of the handicapped child or newborn as an orphan (in 322 
order to focus on his or her direct moral worth, rather than indirect status 323 
acquired through relationships with others).  324 
Grandin does not attempt to give a complete answer to this question. She 325 
notes that there are arguments for and against assigning moral significance to 326 
species-membership that she does not deal with. Grandin does however offer 327 
one reason for the different moral status of cognitively disabled child and cow 328 
that a complete answer will presumably have to take into account. It is that 329 
species membership is something we cannot help but grant strong moral 330 
weight to. As with her first evolutionary argument, this is a claim by Grandin 331 
that again highlights our animal identity. “Why should [a] retarded child or 332 
human newborn have more protection than a cow?,” Grandin asks. “One 333 
reason is that the child is our own species and we protect our own species. 334 
Even lions do not usually dine on lion for dinner . . . there is an instinct to 335 
protect one’s own kind” (2002a: 2). Thus for Grandin there is something 336 
illusory about the thought that we might disregard species membership as a 337 
moral category. The moral significance of being Homo sapiens is something 338 
moral theory can seek to explain but not overcome.  339 
Grandin’s final argument against veganism is inspired by her work in 340 
religious slaughterhouses. According to Grandin, slaughterhouse employees 341 
can be divided into three different categories. The first are those who adopt a 342 
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mechanical approach. They become desensitised to their work, and kill 343 
animals with the same rote indifference with which they might staple boxes 344 
moving along a conveyor belt (1988: 119). The second group are sadists. They 345 
begin to enjoy killing and deliberately torture the animals, justifying their 346 
actions with rationales such as “it is going to die in five minutes so it does not 347 
matter how I treat it” (1988: 120). The third and far superior approach sees 348 
killing as part of a sacred ritual. This understanding, which Grandin 349 
commonly observes in Jewish and Muslim slaughterhouses, exhibits respect 350 
for the animals and approaches slaughter within a ritualised framework, one 351 
that places limits on the act of killing and prevents it from spiralling out of 352 
control (1988: 121). 353 
Grandin has frequently drawn parallels between her slaughter system and 354 
the sacred ritual approach. She has for example described personal rituals she 355 
observes in and around non-religious slaughterhouses, such as bowing before 356 
entry, as well as religious experiences she has had during the killing process 357 
(1988: xx, 2006a: 230). Grandin’s religious understanding of slaughter draws 358 
of a wide range of sources, from traditional theism to sacrificial practices in 359 
Pagan Greece to popular accounts of the Eastern notion of Karma. But in 360 
general, two ideas pervade her discussion of sacred rituals. One is that the 361 
moment of slaughter can make us aware of a larger cosmic order (2006a: 229-362 
30). The second is that killing is a type of therapeutic release for the 363 
slaughterer: encountering death makes us more appreciative of life (2006a: 364 
229). The first of these ideas could potentially be embraced by members of a 365 
wide variety of religious traditions, while the second could in principle be 366 
embraced by a non-believer. Taken together, both notions suggest that 367 
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appropriately conducted slaughter can generate moral knowledge of a kind 368 
not generated in the cultivation of plant food.   369 
 370 
Criticism  371 
What are we to make of Grandin and her unique contribution to modern 372 
agriculture? As a feat of engineering, her system of slaughter combines 373 
technical ingenuity and insight into animal behaviour. Grandin’s design is 374 
based on empathetic insight into animal perception. Whether or not one 375 
thinks the empathetic element extends far enough should not stand in the 376 
way of recognizing that Grandin’s system represents a progressive step 377 
against the backdrop of traditional agriculture.  378 
Grandin’s system however has gaps and limitations. One is that Grandin’s 379 
system allows more painful killing than is formally permitted by U.S. law. 380 
The 1958 Humane Methods of Slaughter Act legally requires that all pigs and 381 
cows killed for food be unconscious at the time of death. That the law was 382 
never enforced explains how Grandin’s system could represent an 383 
improvement over what came before (Jones 2008). Grandin however 384 
maintains that a 100 per cent painless kill rate is not possible. As a 385 
government report Grandin was involved with put it, “Dr. Grandin believes 386 
that effectively stunning animals on the first try 100 per cent of the time is 387 
unachievable—that is why she proposed an objective scoring method as an 388 
alternative” (GAO 2004: 18; Grandin 2006b: 133).  389 
This is an important point that is often overlooked. Painless slaughter was 390 
thought for several decades to be an appropriate standard to aim for from the 391 
ideal point of view. It remains in principle, if not at the level of enforcement, 392 
the standard of American law. Grandin, who may have a more detailed grasp 393 
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of industrial slaughter than anyone else alive, urges that we accept the 394 
inevitability of suffering as part of animal slaughter. As much as her system 395 
seeks to reduce suffering in practice, therefore, at an ideal level it 396 
simultaneously represents a greater tolerance of animal suffering. This is 397 
because of the five per cent of painful animals deaths Grandin considers 398 
acceptable. As one NGO report pointed out, “[e]ven if 100 per cent of 399 
slaughter plants were able to meet [Grandin’s] standards, it would meant that 400 
185 million chickens, 1.8 million cattle and sheep and one million pigs may be 401 
killed inhumanely each year in the United States” (Jones 2008: 86). Grandin’s 402 
method ultimately confirms something critics of industrialized animal killing 403 
have long maintained. Suffering is an inescapable part of the process.7 404 
Food animals can live for years but typically only spend a few hours at a 405 
slaughter facility. Grandin’s system does not address many forms of suffering 406 
that can take place prior to slaughter. These forms include practices such as 407 
castration, branding, animal fighting and intensive confinement. Grandin’s 408 
guidelines also say nothing about what an animal is fed prior to slaughter or 409 
issues having to with the manipulation of an animal’s size and body 410 
structure. Grandin notes that it is now common for dairy cows to be bred at 411 
such a size their feet can no longer support their bodyweight (Grandin 2001: 412 
107). Grandin’s approach, which does not implement welfare regulations that 413 
require economic sacrifice, does not address such issues.  414 
Grandin’s system finally is designed to reduce animal suffering but not 415 
animal killing. This is a limitation, for two reasons. First, it seems plausible to 416 
                                                
7 Grandin’s system also currently does not involve any labelling program. This means that 
unless one eats only meat from McDonald’s, Burger King or other restaurant chains whose 
suppliers employ Grandin’s system, there is no way for consumers to know when they are 
buying meat from animals killed in one of Grandin’s facilities.  
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grant some moral weight to the interest of at least vertebrate animals in 417 
continued existence. Imagine a sick dog or cat that will die unless we give it 418 
an injection (McMahan 2008: 67). Suppose that the animal’s ailment, while it 419 
will end the animal’s life, will cause it no pain. If we were to give the animal a 420 
shot we would be causing it some pain for the sake of extending its life. It 421 
seems intuitive to think that a certain amount of pain from the injection 422 
would be justified if it extended the animal’s life by some non-trivial amount. 423 
If so then from a non-speciesist, and thus protectionist, point of view, it is 424 
reasonable to grant at least some moral weight to the interests that cows and 425 
pigs have in continued existence, an interest Grandin’s system does not 426 
recognize. The second reason why Grandin’s concern with reducing suffering 427 
but not killing is a limitation is that it has an absurd implication. Such a view 428 
suggests that we should painlessly kill dogs, cats and other animals so as to 429 
avoid the possibility of them suffering (McMahan 2002: 201). If they have an 430 
interest only in avoiding suffering and not living, we spare them suffering 431 
while depriving them of nothing of value by painlessly killing them as soon 432 
as possible. This outcome however is at odds with the intuition that no wrong 433 
is done when animals are allowed to live relatively pain-free lives.  434 
These considerations should be born in mind when humane slaughter is 435 
put forward as an alternative to veganism at an idea level. The fact that 436 
humane slaughter does not completely eliminate acts of suffering during 437 
slaughter; does not address significant suffering that occurs before slaughter; 438 
and does not recognize farm animals’ legitimate interest in not being killed, 439 
all suggest that it is not an ideal outcome for farm animals when such an ideal 440 
is informed by a philosophy of animal protection.   441 
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However, for all that animal suffering remains a legitimate subject of 442 
concern in facilities audited by Grandin, it is likely to be a far greater concern 443 
in plants that do not even attempt to follow her guidelines. If it seems 444 
unlikely that Grandin’s system has taken all suffering out of animal slaughter, 445 
it seems equally unlikely that it has made no difference either. The handling 446 
chutes and other elements that reduce an animal’s stress in its final hours are 447 
improvements over previous slaughter systems which did nothing to reduce 448 
the terror animals experienced immediately before death. For this reason, 449 
pointing out problems with Grandin’s approach at an ideal level should not 450 
be taken to show that nothing is gained when plants adopt her approach.  451 
On an ethical level, Grandin’s system encourages slaughterhouse 452 
operators to give moral weight to the issue of animal suffering. In this way it 453 
shares an important commitment with animal protection theory. All else 454 
being equal, it is better for an animal to be killed in a manner recommended 455 
by Grandin that it would be for it to die according to a method of slaughter 456 
which gave no weight to the animal’s suffering, such as killing it with a 457 
sledgehammer, an approach still used in parts of the developing world. 458 
Although sledgehammers have not been used in American slaughterhouses 459 
since the 1950s, slaughter continued to be carried out with little regard for the 460 
animals’ welfare long after this time (Singer 1990, Warrick 2001). Grandin’s 461 
system has raised awareness regarding food animal welfare and reduced their 462 
suffering. Despite its flaws at an ideal level, in the non-ideal world we 463 
actually inhabit, Grandin’s method of slaughter has been a force for good. If it 464 
is not as good as embracing veganism, its superiority over traditional 465 
slaughter is still worth recognizing. 466 
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Some proponents of protection theory might dispute this verdict, on the 467 
grounds that Grandin’s system actually makes life worse for animals than 468 
traditional slaughter. Programs such as Grandin’s, for example, “are 469 
commonly cited by agribusiness during legislative deliberations and used to 470 
argue that it is not necessary to pass legislation to prevent cruel farming 471 
practices” (Farm Sanctuary 2005: 3). This raises the possibility that more 472 
rigorous legal protection for farm animals might exist but for the rise of 473 
humane slaughter. By the same standard, the existence of Grandin’s system 474 
might cause some people to continue to eat meat, and so participate in the 475 
wrong of killing animals, who would have otherwise eschewed meat had 476 
traditional slaughter remained the norm. 477 
In response to this objection, it bears noting that resisting regulatory 478 
change is a failing of the agribusiness industry, not Grandin’s system itself. 479 
There is no contradiction in viewing Grandin’s system of slaughter as better 480 
than traditional slaughter and also favouring increased regulatory protection 481 
for animals. Indeed, there is no contradiction between ranking humane 482 
slaughter better than inhumane slaughter but second best to vegan 483 
agriculture. It also seems to underestimate the intellectual creativity of the 484 
agribusiness sector to think that if Grandin’s system did not exist, its 485 
representatives would be unable to find some other rationale for opposing 486 
greater regulation.  487 
As for people who would have stopped eating meat, I am unaware of 488 
anyone who actually falls into this category, and the concern that some such 489 
people may exist would seem speculative. Suppose however we grant that 490 
some such people do exist. The objection would still only be worth heeding if 491 
they were above a trivial number. Meta-analysis of survey data obtained 492 
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between the mid-1990s and 2018 suggests that between two and six per cent 493 
of the American public identify as vegetarians. A significant portion of this 494 
group however also report “eating meat when asked to list everything they 495 
ate during two non-consecutive 24-hour periods” (Šimčikas 2018). When 496 
people who eat meat are removed from the survey data approximately one 497 
per cent of the population identifies as vegetarian and does not eat meat, an 498 
amount that has not significantly changed since the mid-1990s (Šimčikas 499 
2018). Let us imagine that without the existence of Grandin’s system, the 500 
percentage of vegetarians would double to two percent of the population. In 501 
other words, let us assume that the absence of Grandin’s system would be as 502 
powerful a motivator to adopt vegetarianism as all actually existing 503 
motivations combined. Even under this generous assumption, the number of 504 
additional people who would have become vegetarian is small. Given the 505 
large number of animals now processed by Grandin’s system, it does not 506 
seem reasonable to view the reduction in their suffering as being outweighed 507 
by the failure of the vegetarian population to rise from one to two percent. 508 
Even in such a world, the reduced suffering of the vast majority of animals 509 
killed to feed 98 percent of society would be a significant moral gain. 510 
Another reason some protectionists may not rank Grandin’s system 511 
superior to traditional slaughter is due to the thought that it increases 512 
profitability. As Gary Francione puts it, Grandin’s work means that meat 513 
companies are “becoming better at exploiting animals in an economically 514 
efficient manner by adopting measures that improve meat quality and worker 515 
safety” (2008: 75). On this understanding of Grandin’s system, the ostensible 516 
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concern with animal well-being is a fig leaf obscuring its real rationale, which 517 
is the more efficient exploitation of animals.8  518 
This objection takes at face value Grandin’s frequent assertions that a 519 
humane system is also a more profitable one. Grandin’s discussion of the 520 
economic impact of humane slaughter however is often couched in general 521 
terms. Neither Grandin’s popular writings nor her academic texts discuss the 522 
economic costs of implementing her system. When she has specified possible 523 
cost savings they have sometimes turned out to be small. In 1995 for example 524 
Grandin calculated that bruises of fed steers and heifers cost the industry $22 525 
million per year, or one dollar per animal (Grandin 2000). At the time a 500-526 
600 pound steer would have sold for $330-$400 (Shulz 2018). This raises the 527 
possibility that the economic advantages of Grandin’s system may be 528 
minimal. Independent studies of the economic impact of farm animal welfare 529 
regulations also document that they can increase rather than reduce costs. 530 
One study for example found that the introduction of minimum space 531 
requirements for egg-laying hens saw the price of eggs increase nine percent 532 
(Mullaly and Lusk 2018). Although the study looked at the egg rather than 533 
beef industry it nevertheless serves as a reminder that welfare measures need 534 
not save the industry any money. The claim that Grandin’s system makes the 535 
exploitation of animals more efficient thus remains unproven.  536 
But Even if Grandin’s system did increase profitability this would not 537 
gainsay its status as an improvement on traditional slaughter. The meat 538 
industry has long been extremely efficient to begin with. During the period in 539 
which Grandin’s system has been in operation, there has been little chance of 540 
the general public converting to vegetarianism, let alone veganism, en masse. 541 
                                                
8 An anonymous reviewer raised this objection.  
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For the overwhelming majority of the animals involved, the realistic options 542 
were being slaughtered according to either Grandin’s method or its less-543 
humane predecessor. The reduction in suffering Grandin’s system represents 544 
is justified even if it comes at the cost of some gain in industry efficiency, 545 
particularly if that gain is small or negligible.  546 
Grandin’s Arguments for Omnivorism Revisited  547 
As we saw, two of Grandin’s four arguments for meat-eating involved an 548 
appeal to evolution. Anyone who follows contemporary political debates will 549 
recognize in Grandin’s work a curious shift that often occurs when 550 
evolutionary theory is invoked in contentious moral disputes. Although 551 
evolutionary theory emphasises flux, adaptation and change on an 552 
explanatory level, it is frequently invoked at a normative level to prevent or 553 
rule out some innovation or shift. The defence of traditional gender roles 554 
offered by evolutionary psychologists against feminist critiques is a well-555 
known example. In Grandin’s case, the “unnatural” option in question is 556 
switching to a meat-free diet. In this way her work reflects the time and place 557 
in which it was written, North America after the rise of evolution as not only 558 
a biological paradigm, but a cultural touchstone as well.  559 
Grandin has something in common with other writers who make 560 
normative appeal to evolutionary processes. Such thinkers commonly take it 561 
for granted that if such processes have normative implications, they must be 562 
conservative. That is, it seems routine for thinkers who make normative 563 
appeals to Darwinism to overlook the possibility that evolutionary theory 564 
might challenge the status quo in a given field. In Grandin’s case, she appeals 565 
to a concept of what is natural in an evolutionary sense to ground a 566 
conservative stance toward animal agriculture. Yet such an argument passes 567 
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over in silence the many aspects of industrial farming that violate or redirect 568 
the animals’ normal biological functions.  569 
As an example, consider the account Grandin offers of the steps a farmer 570 
took to breed pigs at an economically efficient rate: 571 
 572 
Each boar had his own little perversion the man had to do to 573 
get the boar turned on so he could collect the semen. Some 574 
of them were just things like the boar wanted to have his 575 
dandruff scratched while they were collecting him. (Pigs 576 
have big flaky dandruff all over their backs.) The other 577 
things the man had to do were a lot more intimate. He might 578 
have to hold the boar’s penis in exactly the right way the 579 
boar liked, and he had to masturbate some of them in exactly 580 
the right way. There was one boar, he told me, who wanted 581 
to have his butt hole played with. “I have to stick my finger 582 
in his butt, he just really loves that,” he told me. Then he got 583 
all red in the face. I’m not going to tell you his name, 584 
because I know he’d be embarrassed (Grandin and Johnson 585 
2005: 103). 586 
 587 
The activity Grandin describes here is a form of beastiality, something 588 
boars do not spontaneously seek out with humans, with whom they cannot 589 
reproduce. The sexual element may make us squeamish, but it symbolizes a 590 
larger truth about agriculture. When it is practiced on an industrial scale it 591 
requires frustrating or redirecting an animal’s normal behaviors or biology, 592 
most obviously through confinement, but also through procedures mentioned 593 
above such as castration. Grandin’s evolutionary perspective asks us to take 594 
seriously the idea that an animal’s evolved nature is relevant to determining 595 
how we should treat it. But even if we grant for the sake of argument that 596 
evolutionary theory should be conceived of in normative terms, it is not clear 597 
why its implications are necessarily conservative. It could just as easily be 598 
taken to justify a radical critique of the meat industry and the many 599 
“unnatural” acts in involves. Even if Grandin’s normative understanding of 600 
revolutionary theory is correct, in short, it seems inadequate. For there are 601 
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many elements of modern agriculture that do not meet the standard of 602 
naturalness Grandin appeals to in her evolutionary mode.  603 
But let us look beyond this general consideration to the specific 604 
evolutionary arguments that Grandin offers. As we saw, the first one took 605 
over the idea of co-evolution from Budiansky, whose argument was in turn 606 
inspired by the work of archeologist David Rindos. A potential danger that 607 
can occur when a theory from one discipline is invoked to settle a debate in 608 
another is that the theory in question is mischaracterized as being more 609 
settled and authoritative in the home discipline than is in fact the case. I 610 
believe this has happened with Budiansky’s appropriation of Rindos. He does 611 
not adequately acknowledge that while Rindos’s theory is a respectable one 612 
within archeology, it has inevitably been subject to criticism and debate.  613 
In a review of theories of domestication for example, archeologist Peter 614 
Bellwood notes that the domestication of plant crops took place with different 615 
speeds in different regions, and that Rindos’s emphasis on co-evolution is 616 
better able to explain the gradual domestication of fruits and tubers that took 617 
place in regions such as New Guinea and the Amazon than the sudden 618 
explosion of cereal crops that took place in China and Mesopotamia 619 
(Bellwood 2005: 25). Bellwood cautions against “one line explanations” for 620 
something as complex and regionally diverse as the rise of agriculture, and 621 
argues that co-evolution is more appropriately regarded as one among many 622 
concepts that need to be invoked to explain the origin of domestication. To 623 
the degree that there are grounds to doubt the history of domestication 624 
Budiansky relies on, therefore, there will also be grounds to doubt the 625 
normative implications Budiansky derives from that history.  626 
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Let us assume however that Budiansky’s historical account is correct. Even 627 
if that were the case, his argument would still face a problem. Why should a 628 
co-evolutionary account of the origins of animal agriculture have the 629 
normative implication that we must continue to eat meat? Rindos, it is worth 630 
noting, does not see any conservative implications following from co-631 
evolutionary theory as it applies to plants. “Although I call for a 632 
nonintentionalistic interpretation of the evolution of agricultural systems, this 633 
is not to be read as support for the status quo; indeed, the reverse is true” 634 
(Rindos 1984: 285). Rindos gives the example of plant-breeding projects and 635 
agricultural developments that arise in response to food shortages. If the co-636 
evolutionary theory is correct, he argues, then it will only enhance the 637 
breeding of improved crops and other conscious agricultural changes (1984: 638 
284). If coevolution does not entail conservatism in the case of plants, why 639 
should things be any different with animals?  640 
It is a shortcoming of Budiansky’s account that he does not answer this 641 
question. He instead seems to take it for granted that if animal agriculture had 642 
a non-intentional origin, this implies that we have a moral obligation to 643 
continue raising animals for slaughter. Such an assumption however is 644 
unlikely. Since the time of David Hume, philosophers have debated whether 645 
it makes sense to see is-claims as entailing ought-claims. Even critics who 646 
reject Hume’s unbridgeable divide between facts and values acknowledge 647 
that moral claims can be derived from factual statements in a simplistic and 648 
hasty way. In Budiansky’s case, his particular transition from the realm of 649 
causation to that of justification is bedeviled by two issues that undermine his 650 
conclusion that “we have no choice” but to continue eating pigs, chickens and 651 
cows.  652 
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The first problem is that his claim that we must continue raising animals 653 
to eat them is at odds with by Budiansky’s reliance on the concept of a 654 
preadaptation. On Budiansky’s telling, the docility and other traits that made 655 
some species suitable for domestication originally arose for a different reason 656 
in nature. Yet if that is the case, it means there is no necessary link between a 657 
trait’s continued existence and its continuing to perform the same function. In 658 
the United States for example some vegans currently operate sanctuaries for 659 
farm animals, where cows, pigs and chickens receive food and shelter for the 660 
purpose of their own protection rather than slaughter. If factory farms 661 
declined while the number of such sanctuaries increased, it would represent a 662 
form of domestication detached from the purpose of meat eating. Something 663 
similar would happen if our society saw a widescale conversion to Hinduism, 664 
in which we no longer raised cattle for beef but regarded them as holy 665 
creatures, allowing them to walk the streets as they do in India.  666 
Such new forms of domestication are worth considering not because they 667 
are likely to happen any time soon, but because they illustrate the conceptual 668 
possibility of docile animals continuing to exist without being raised for food. 669 
Such a transition would only be in keeping with Budiansky’s narrative of 670 
preadaptation. Yet when it comes to defending the status quo regarding meat 671 
eating, Budiansky equates the idea of domesticated animals continuing to 672 
exist with the idea of their continuing to perform the same function. This is 673 
inconsistent with the evolutionary story he tells, which separates the question 674 
of a trait’s continued existence from its continuing to perform the same 675 
function.  676 
The second problem with Budiansky’s argument cuts deeper. It has to do 677 
with the bedrock notion that if something has an evolutionary rather than 678 
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intentional origin, that fact obliges us to preserve the thing in question. There 679 
are aspects of our own biology that are the result of non-conscious 680 
evolutionary forces, yet we do not take this to rule out change and 681 
intervention regarding those traits. Human beings for example evolved so as 682 
to be susceptible to viruses and to reproduce through sex. None of these 683 
biological truths however show that a moral wrong occurs when someone 684 
takes anti-viral medication or practices birth control. A co-evolutionary 685 
understanding of the origin of agriculture no more obliges us to preserve 686 
agricultural practices that arose nine thousand years ago than an evolutionary 687 
understanding of biology obliges us to preserve aspects of our own biological 688 
identity that are even older.   689 
Grandin links her evolutionary account to the idea that food animals 690 
themselves benefit from domestication, in that they experience a death more 691 
merciful than that which they experience in the wild. It is not clear however 692 
why this is relevant. An animal dying in nature has a different consequence 693 
than one killed for food. When it is eaten by another predator or decomposes 694 
into the earth, it contributes to the ongoing existence of other animal and 695 
plant life. It is doubtful that there is currently any realistic way for ecosystems 696 
to sustain themselves other than through the natural cycle of life and death. It 697 
is plausible therefore to think animal deaths in the wild are necessary, in a 698 
way that raising and killing them for food is not.  699 
Grandin’s second evolutionary argument holds that human beings had 700 
evolved so as to require both meat and plant food. This claim overlooks 701 
evidence suggesting that the health impact of vegetarian diets is either 702 
positive or neutral. The official view of the American Dietetic Association’s 703 
for example is that  “appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total 704 
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vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful [and] nutritionally adequate . . . Well-705 
planned vegetarian diets are appropriate for individuals during all stages of 706 
the life cycle, including pregnancy” (ADA 2009: 1266). That meat-free diets 707 
can be healthy has also been acknowledged by national dietician associations 708 
in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom (DAA 2018, DOC 2003, BDA 709 
2005). Such statements remind us that it is possible to live a healthy life 710 
without eating meat. This is surely why vegans have existed for thousands of 711 
years, and why they exist in large numbers in places like India today.  712 
But the primary reason dieticians’ statements are worth noting is to 713 
illustrate the standard of proof that Grandin must meet to substantiate her 714 
claim that avoiding meet is not in keeping with our biology. She would have 715 
to explain away the nutritional evidence running counter to her suggestion, 716 
and present negative health evidence of her own. That Grandin does neither 717 
of these things suggests that she may misunderstand the sense in which it is 718 
accurate to say our species evolved as both plant and meat eaters. We are 719 
natural omnivores in the sense that we are able to digest either plant or 720 
animal foods, not in the sense that our biology requires us to continue to 721 
consume both. Grandin is therefore wrong to say that our evolutionary 722 
history rules out widespread veganism.  723 
In recounting her own experience on a vegetarian diet, Grandin suggests 724 
that the situation may be different for people with autism. This is a more 725 
limited claim, but it also suffers from a lack of evidence. Unlike her habit 726 
elsewhere in her writings, Grandin does not cite any scientific evidence for 727 
her empirical claim about autistic physiology. Nor does she take note of the 728 
experience of other autistic authors who have given up meat without 729 
reporting any negative health consequences (O’Neill 2000: 225; Hull 2018). 730 
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Meat-free diets are in fact fairly common among autistic people, in part 731 
because they have a lower level of food acceptance than the general public 732 
(Ledford and Gast 2006). As a guide to food issues for autistic adults notes, 733 
“many of us are vegetarians or vegans, or ‘want to be,’ or are working toward 734 
the goal of vegetarianism” (Clark 2002: 1). Such factors suggests that Grandin 735 
either has made a false generalization from her own experience, or wrongly 736 
blamed her vegetarian diet for health problems that were caused by another 737 
source.  738 
In addition to advancing evolutionary arguments, Grandin, as we saw, 739 
took up the question of why we extend a greater moral status to a disabled 740 
human than we do to an animal with a similar level of cognitive ability. Her 741 
response was that biologically, we have an instinct to protect our own kind. 742 
Given how the handicapped and other groups have historically been 743 
ostracized, this claim requires more support than Grandin provides. 744 
However, even if Grandin is right, it still does not justify the moral chasm that 745 
separates animals from severely mentally handicapped humans. An instinct 746 
to protect members of our own kind only precludes higher moral status for 747 
animals if morality must always overlap with what our instincts tell us to do. 748 
Anger and sexual attraction may be instinctive, however, but we do not take 749 
this to show that giving reign to our temper or our sexual impulses is always 750 
justified. So even if we did have an instinct to protect every member of our 751 
own species, it would not justify a lower moral status for animals. 752 
Grandin’s final argument invoked the moral knowledge generated by 753 
slaughter. This argument has special significance, in that people with autism 754 
have traditionally been thought to have such empty interiors as to rule out the 755 
very possibility of inner self-examination. The autistic psyche was long 756 
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likened to an “empty fortress,” as the title of a book on autism once put it 757 
(Bettelheim 1972). Grandin’s reflections on slaughter as a ritual serve as a 758 
valuable reminder that the inner lives of people with autism can be rich and 759 
complex enough to engage in the quest for meaning that is often associated 760 
with religion. An exhaustive account of the ethical significance of Grandin’s 761 
writings would need to give special emphasis to this aspect of her work.  762 
When it comes to the narrow issue of the ethical status of animals, 763 
however, Grandin’s reflections do not justify continuing to kill them for food. 764 
One reason is the perennial problem of religious arguments not holding 765 
legitimacy for people who do not share the religion in question. The idea that 766 
killing animals places us in touch with a larger cosmic order makes 767 
supernatural assumptions that many modern readers do not share and for 768 
which Grandin offers no justification. Even if we overlook this, however, 769 
there are other grounds on which someone who took a religious view of the 770 
universe could have a similar experience. They might read a religious text, or 771 
pray or reflect on animal birth rather than death. Even if we grant the 772 
importance of cosmic awareness, therefore, there are surely other ways to 773 
achieve it than through mechanized killing, which could be abolished without 774 
reducing the possibility or likelihood of spiritual development.   775 
A similar problem holds with Grandin’s claim that killing animals helps 776 
us see the value of life. Even if it is always true—and Grandin’s account of 777 
sadist slaughterhouse employees suggests it is not—it is unlikely we will stop 778 
valuing life if we stop eating meat. If anything, an ethics of affirming life 779 
seems most in keeping with a refusal to kill animals when we do not have to.   780 
There is a noticeable difference between Grandin’s work as a designer of 781 
slaughterhouses and her work as a critic of veganism. When it comes to 782 
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designing slaughterhouses, Grandin is focused and methodical. She works 783 
from an interlocking set of principle drawn from animal behaviour research 784 
and applies them in a systematic way to the problem of slaughterhouse 785 
design. When it comes to addressing the problem of veganism, by contrast, 786 
Grandin invokes a series of ad hoc arguments derived from many different 787 
sources, ranging from evolutionary theory to spiritual experiences she has 788 
had inside slaughterhouses. Taken individually, none of her arguments 789 
succeed. Collectively, they highlight a major blind spot in Grandin’s writings. 790 
In the matter of veganism, Grandin has for years criticized it on unjustified 791 
grounds. Despite her valuable contributions to the well-being of animals as a 792 
designer of humane slaughterhouses, this is a serious shortcoming of her 793 
work.  794 
Conclusion  795 
One of Grandin’s most popular works, Thinking in Pictures, contains a 796 
photograph of a Buffalo-handling facility Grandin designed for a wildlife 797 
refuge in Oklahoma. Bison who pass through the facility are auctioned off 798 
once a year to private breeders, so the facility ultimately serves the purpose of 799 
slaughter. But that is not its only function. It is also used for conservation 800 
purposes, as when Buffalo in the park require veterinary attention. As such, 801 
the photo gives rise to reflection on alternative uses for Grandin’s gifts. In a 802 
more humane universe than ours, one can imagine Grandin having 803 
opportunities to use her unique insights into animal behaviour for a purpose 804 
other than slaughter. Which is to say, for a purpose other than endless and 805 
unnecessary killing.  806 
As it stands, the Grandin who exists in our universe warrants both 807 
praise and criticism. Many of the criticisms offered above could be avoided if 808 
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Grandin admitted that vegetarianism was morally superior to meat 809 
consumption, and instead defended humane slaughter as a second-best 810 
compromise. The great value of her system is that it has the capacity to make 811 
a difference in a world of meat eating, which animal protection advocates to 812 
date have not been able to eliminate. Grandin’s misguided attempts to 813 
portray humane slaughter as superior to veganism defend her approach at 814 
the wrong level. She opposes it to veganism in ideal terms, when it is more 815 
plausible regarded as a pragmatic compromise at the non-idea level.  816 
Grandin’s writings speak to a real ethical impulse in the way they focus on 817 
the moral issues surrounding slaughter. Grandin’s particular method of 818 
addressing those issues, however, allows a meat-eating society to maintain a 819 
compartmentalized view of animals, one that never implicates consumers in 820 
the negative aspects of meat production. Just how indulgent Grandin’s 821 
approach is toward the appetite for meat can be seen by comparing it to 822 
compromise views that fall short of veganism yet nonetheless call for reduced 823 
meat consumption. One such view for example recommends a diet that 824 
includes a limited amount of free-range beef alongside plant foods (Davis 825 
2003). Another holds that the average person would be better off cutting meat 826 
consumptions of all kinds, whether it is beef, chicken or anything else (Pollan 827 
2006). A third possible compromise is the  “vegan before six” diet. It sees 828 
dinner is the only meal of the day in which meat is consumed, and even then 829 
only in small amounts (Parker-Pole 2009).  830 
These diets all have something in common. They are all premised on the 831 
view that it is reasonable to ask people to make changes regarding the 832 
amount of meat they consume. Grandin’s dietary ethic is different from these 833 
compromise views in that it does not ask the average meat-consumer to 834 
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reduce the amount of meat in his or her diet even slightly. On Grandin’s 835 
account one could have a daily diet of bacon for breakfast, chicken for lunch 836 
and steak for dinner and still have done all one could to reduce animal harm. 837 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that the meat industry would embrace a reformer 838 
with this particular message. One has to wonder however how far we can go 839 
in reducing animal harm when the amount of meat consumed remains off the 840 
table of discussion. Grandin’s animal ethic is one with real moral value. Yet 841 
from the point of view of protection theory it ultimately signifies not how far 842 
our society has come regarding animals, but how far we still have to go.  843 
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